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Abstract
To address the impact of regulation on ethical concerns of con-
sumers, we study the example of minimum wages. In our experimental
market, consumers have monopsony power, firms set prices and wages,
and workers are passive recipients of a wage payment. We find that the
majority of consumers occasionally deviate from their self-interest and
that markets with such consumers exhibit substantially higher wages.
Consumers implement fair allocations using two distinct strategies:
they split their demand equally between firms, or they buy all units
from the firm with the higher price and higher wage. The two strate-
gies can be captured by maximin preferences and indirect reciprocity
in Charness and Rabin’s (2002) reciprocal fairness model. Introducing
a minimum wage in a market raises average wages despite its signifi-
cant crowding out e↵ects on consumers’ fairness concerns. Abolishing
a minimum wage crowds in consumer fairness concerns, but crowding
in is not su cient to avoid overall negative e↵ects on workers’ wages.
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In the last decade, the behavior of firms with regard to worker protection,
climate change, and other ethically relevant issues has received public at-
tention. Firms can profit from fair behavior toward their workers or from
environment-friendly production technologies if a su cient number of con-
sumers are willing to pay a higher price for their products than for products
of other firms. Moreover, publicity of firms using child labor or engaging
in other unfair or ecologically harmful practices can decrease firm profits
substantially.
While some consumers buy fair trade products or sign up for electricity
from renewable sources, these products have relatively small market shares.1
This suggests that regulation might be necessary to achieve the desired levels
of environmental protection, wages, worker rights, etc. However, it is an open
question how such regulation a↵ects consumer behavior. Market experiments
that study the interaction of consumers and firms in markets have found
that consumers exhibit non-selfish behavior and that this depends on the
exact market conditions.2 To tightly control the regulatory changes and
their sequencing, we run a laboratory experiment.
The e↵ects of government interventions on consumer behavior can be
ambiguous. Apart from the direct e↵ect of the regulation, e.g., forcing firms
to pay a certain minimum wage, indirect e↵ects can play a role if consumers
are not purely selfish. On the one hand, a minimum wage might undermine
the reputation gain of a firm from paying workers a fair wage and as a result
lead to lower wages. Also, if consumers are willing to pay for a fair treatment
of workers, a minimum wage can crowd out such fair behavior by consumers.
On the other hand, a minimum wage can be interpreted by consumers as an
1 For example, in Germany where fair trade is relatively important compared to other
countries, fair trade cocoa achieved a market share of 8% in 2017 and fair trade co↵ee
4.1% (TransFair e.V. 2018). Globally, the market share of fair trade cocoa is less than 1%
(International Cocoa Organization 2019).
2For example, Bartling, Weber, and Yao (2015) and Rode et al. (2008) show that
fairness of firms and consumers can survive in a market context. By contrast, Falk and
Szech (2013) suggest that markets erode fairness while Pigors and Rockenbach (2016)
demonstrate that whether fair behavior pays for firms depends on the market structure.
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indication that market wages are too low. If that is the case and in particular
if the minimum wage is low, consumers will pay more attention to the wages
paid by firms and possibly condition their purchase decision on fair wages.
We ask in a controlled setting how regulations that target the externalities
of interest interact with the willingness of consumers to pay higher prices for
fair behavior of firms. Our study di↵ers from existing experimental work on
crowding out in that our setting is characterized by a tradeo↵ between short-
term and long-term fairness. Consumers can provide incentives for firms
to increase wages in the future by buying from firms that pay high wages.
This, however, harms the workers of low-wage firms in the short run. Thus,
strategies that help workers in the short run are in conflict with strategies
that can help them in the long run, rendering the decision complex.
In the experiment, we use a setup where consumers are monopsonists
in a duopoly market. Workers have no bargaining power as they have no
decision to take. They are employed by a firm and can neither be fired nor
quit themselves. Their only source of income is the wage. The consumer
is informed about the prices and wages of both firms. He can then decide
which firm to buy from, and he can also split his demand between firms.
The market lasts for 20 periods, which gives the consumer the possibility to
enforce higher wages by buying from the firm with the higher wage.
Our two-by-two design serves to investigate the e↵ects of the introduction
and removal of two di↵erent minimum wages. In two treatments, there is
no minimum wage initially, but it is introduced after the first half of the
experiment. These treatments di↵er only with regard to the level of the
minimum wage. In the other two treatments, there is a minimum wage
at the beginning, but it is removed after the first half of the experiment,
again for both minimum wage levels. This allows us to study the e↵ect of a
minimum wage at di↵erent stages of experience in a market, and the e↵ect
of changes in the minimum wage policy for di↵erent levels of the minimum
wage.
We observe that in all treatments the majority of consumers occasionally
deviate from their own self-interest by buying some or even all units from the
more expensive firm.There are two complementary strategies the consumers
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use to achieve fair outcomes for the workers. First, consumers often split
purchases equally between firms even when prices di↵er. Second, they some-
times buy all units at the more expensive firm that also pays a higher wage.
These strategies reflect the complex fairness problem that consumers face.
Buying from both firms secures an income for both workers. Alternatively,
punishing the low-wage firm by not buying from it can be an attempt to
encourage the firm to pay a higher wage in the future.
Regarding the e↵ects of a minimum wage, we find that its introduction
leads to a significant increase in the workers’ rents. Removing a minimum
wage always a↵ects the workers negatively. Furthermore, consumers adjust
their behavior to changes in the minimum wage, and these adjustments are
larger than what can be explained by changes in prices and wages. We show
this with the help of simple regressions as well as a structural estimation
of the model by Charness and Rabin (2002). The model captures short-
and long-term fairness concerns through its components of maximin social
preferences and negative reciprocity. While maximin equalizes payo↵s in
the short term, punishing unfair firms can lead to higher wages in the long
term. Overall, we find crowding out of fairness concerns in response to the
introduction of a minimum wage and crowding in when the minimum wage
is removed.
In line with the idea that achieving fairness in markets can be a com-
plex task involving multiple strategies, existing experimental studies detect
various determinants of such fairness. Pigors and Rockenbach (2016) demon-
strate that socially responsible production is profitable in an oligopoly but
not in a monopoly setting. Irlenbusch and Saxler (2019) find that two prop-
erties of markets, namely social information and buyer-seller framing, a↵ect
the fairness of subjects whereas di↵usion of responsibility does not. Sutter
et al. (2020) focus on fairness in double auction markets, and Kirchler et al.
(2016) show that individual decisions and decisions in markets react to fac-
tors such as anonymity and incentives in a similar way. Moreover, it emerges
that certification can be useful for internalizing externalities in markets; see
Etile´ and Teyssier (2016). Addressing the external validity of fairness in
market experiments, Engelmann, Friedrichsen, and Ku¨bler (2018) show that
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fair consumer behavior in a market experiment significantly correlates with
preferences for fair trade products.
Our experiment also relates to the literature on crowding out of intrin-
sic motivation with extrinsic or economic incentives, see Frey (1997), Frey
and Jegen (2001), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), (2000b), Falk and Kosfeld
(2006) as well as Ostrom (2000). In contrast to some of these studies (e.g.,
Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b, and Falk and Kosfeld 2006) where an a↵ected
party limits the freedom of choice of the participant, the minimum wage in
our experiment is introduced or abolished exogenously, i.e., by the experi-
menter. One could expect this to have a weaker negative e↵ect, because the
restriction cannot be interpreted as a lack of trust. Nevertheless, we find
that the regulation crowds out fair behavior.
Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder (2006) study the impact of a minimum wage on
the reservation wage of workers and on their fairness perceptions. Brandts
and Charness (2004) investigate the e↵ect of a minimum wage in a labor
market characterized by gift exchange between workers and employers. In
contrast to this experimental work on minimum wages, we focus on the con-
sumer reaction to a minimum wage, not the workers’.
We study minimum wages as an example of a legal regulation that pro-
tects third parties. Because of this focus, we abstract from many other
aspects that are relevant in the discussion of minimum wages, such as em-
ployment e↵ects. In our experimental design, employment is exogenously
fixed to keep the question of what is a fair wage simpler for the consumers.3
Our experiment is related to the literature on indirect reciprocity be-
cause consumers can punish firms for unfair treatment of the workers. Sub-
3A large portion of the empirical literature on minimum wages investigates the employ-
ment e↵ect of raising the minimum wage. This has been controversial (Card 1992, Card
and Krueger 1994, Dickens, Machin, and Manning 1999). Empirical studies on minimum
wages have also observed so-called spillover e↵ects. An increase in the minimum wage
has been found to increase wages by more than the required amount (Card and Krueger
1995, Katz and Krueger 1992). In line with this research, we observe in our experimental
data set that consumers and firms are willing to pay more than the minimum wage. In
particular, depending on the treatment the average wage is 12%–64% above the minimum
wage. Note that e ciency-wage reasons cannot play a role in our experiment as the e↵ort
of the worker is fixed.
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stantial evidence of indirect reciprocity has been observed in helping games
(see Seinen and Schram 2006, and Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009) and in
third-party punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). There is experimen-
tal evidence from a three-person ultimatum game (Gu¨th and van Damme
1998, and Gu¨th, Schmidt and Sutter 2007) where the proposer can allocate
money to a responder and to a dummy, the responder can accept or reject
the proposal, and the dummy is passive. This evidence suggests that the
responders’ willingness to punish proposers for the sake of the dummy player
is quite limited. An important di↵erence to our and similar market experi-
ments is that a consumer can choose between two firms and can hence play
them o↵ against each other. Switching to the fairer firm is a relatively ef-
fective and cheap punishment in contrast to rejections in the three-player
ultimatum game, particularly if the price di↵erence is small. Note, however,
that punishing a firm also punishes its worker, which renders it di cult to
achieve a fair outcome in the short run.4
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
design in detail. In Section 3 we analyze the choices of firms and consumers.
Section 4 presents the estimation of the Charness-Rabin (2002) model, and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
We study a duopoly market with one consumer who can buy up to 10 units
of a fictitious homogeneous good. Each unit has a value of 25 points for
the consumer. Both firms are run by a manager, and we will refer to them
as firms in the following. Each firm employs one worker. The workers are
actual participants in the experiment, even though they have no choice to
make. By each firm having one worker without a decision right, we capture a
situation with strong competition among workers and where tasks are easily
4Achieving a fair market outcome is simpler in Engelmann, Friedrichsen, and Ku¨bler
(2018), where we use a similar design but with one worker who is hired by both firms. In
this case, buying at the firm with the higher wage unambiguously helps the worker in the
short run and, as long as firms react to this action by raising wages, also in the long run.
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enforceable. The firm can produce up to 10 units of the good. The firm
chooses a price (per unit) p 2 [0, 50] and a wage w (per unit). If no minimum
wage is in place, then w 2 [0, 50], otherwise w 2 [w, 50], where w 2 {3, 6}
denotes the minimum wage that is varied across treatments.5 The firms
cannot price discriminate, i.e., the same price-wage combination holds for all
10 units, and the firms do not have an option to restrict supply except by
raising the price to a prohibitively high level. Wages are paid only for units
actually sold and there are no other costs. Workers have no costs, no other
source of income than the wage, and no outside option. If a consumer buys
a unit from a firm that has chosen price p and wage w, the consumer earns
25   p for this unit, the firm makes a profit of p   w and the worker earns
w. These earnings are multiplied by the purchased number of units in order
to compute total earnings in a period.
The timing of the game is as follows. After the two firms have made their
choices, the consumer is informed about both firms’ price-wage pairs (p1, w1)
and (p2, w2). He then decides how many units to buy from each of the two
firms. The consumer can buy any combination of integer amounts from the
two firms up to a total quantity of 10, and he can also buy no units at all.
At the end of each period the participants are informed about all decisions
in their group, i.e., about both firms’ price-wage combinations and about the
decision of the consumer.
The stage game with selfish agents has three subgame-perfect equilibria.
In each of these, firms set w = 0 if there is no minimum wage and w = w
if there is a minimum wage. The equilibrium prices are p = w, p = w + 1
or p = w + 2 (with p1 = p2), and the consumer always buys 10 units from
the cheaper firm, as long as min(p1, p2) < 25, which always holds on the
equilibrium path. O↵ the equilibrium path, the consumer buys nothing if
min(p1, p2) > 25 for both firms and an arbitrary quantity if min(p1, p2) = 25.
If both firms choose the same price, in equilibrium the consumer can split his
demand in an arbitrary way between the two firms. Note that in equilibrium
5We also conducted a few sessions for w = 1 and w = 9, but decided to focus on w = 3
and w = 6 in later sessions. With w = 1, the minimum wage has hardly any e↵ect while
it is almost always binding in the case of w = 9.
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almost the whole surplus goes to the consumer.6 In contrast, the payo↵s are
split equally among all five market participants if both firms choose p = 20,
w = 10 and the consumer buys five units from each of the firms. In this case
the payo↵ for all participants is ⇡ = 10 ·5 = 50. Hence, the minimum wage of
three or six that we implemented is below the wage that would ensure equal
payo↵s.
Note that as long as the consumer buys 10 units, the total earnings in the
market are constant. How a consumer spreads his purchases across the two
firms does not a↵ect the total earnings. This has the appealing property of
allowing us to study consumer concerns for fairness that are not confounded
with concerns for e ciency. 7
Details of the implementation are as follows. We used a fixed-matching
protocol where a group of five participants (one consumer and two firm-
worker pairs) stayed together during the entire experiment. The main moti-
vation for fixed groups is that we are interested in a situation where consumer
behavior can drive firm behavior. Participants kept their role for the whole
experiment in order to enhance possible inequalities and fairness concerns.
The experiment lasted for 40 periods.
An important aspect of our design is that in spite of the repeated inter-
action, consumers do not have a strategic incentive to signal that they care
about fairness if in fact they do not. There is no reason to pretend to be
fair in order to change other subjects’ behavior (though consumers may still
pretend to be fair to preserve a positive (self-)image). This is in contrast to
many other experiments that try to assess the fairness concerns of players,
6As the stage game has three equilibria with p = w, p = w + 1 or p = w + 2, collusive
equilibria of the repeated game exist due to the possibility to punish deviations. While
our main focus is on wages, we note that we do not find evidence of collusive firm behavior
(see Table 1 below). In addition, all equilibria involve wages equal to the minimum wage.
If the consumer is selfish, he does not want to pay more for a higher wage and thus a
(selfish but collusive) firm has no reason to pay higher wages.
7See Kritikos and Bolle (2001), Charness and Rabin (2002), Engelmann and Strobel
(2004), and Harrison and Johnson (2006) for evidence that experimental subjects fre-
quently exhibit preferences to maximize the total payo↵. These papers show that the
interpretation of many experimental results as evidence of fairness concerns is problem-
atic since fairness concerns are frequently confounded with concerns for e ciency.
8
such as ultimatum, trust, and gift-exchange games. In these games, signal-
ing typically increases the extent of fair behavior in early periods of repeated
games, because the presence of a small share of fair players (or the mere pos-
sibility that they exist) makes it possible for selfish players to mimic them.8
In our experiment, since higher wages translate at least to some degree into
higher prices, selfish consumers want to signal that they do not care about
the worker but only about low prices.
To study the e↵ects of changes in the minimum wage policy, we conducted
two sets of treatments. In the NMF treatments (No Minimum wage First),
there was no minimum wage initially, but it was introduced after the first 20
periods. In the MF treatments (Minimum wage First), a minimum wage was
in place initially, but it was abolished after 20 periods. At the beginning of
the experiment, the participants were informed that there would be a change
in the rules after 20 periods without mentioning that this change concerned
the minimum wage. They were also informed that the group composition and
the role assignment would not be changed. We implemented a market frame.
In the instructions (for the full text see the appendix), participants are called
consumers, firms, and workers, and we used the terms “prices” and “wages.”9
The minimum wage was introduced as follows. In the MF treatments, it was
stated that the wage had to equal at least w. The minimum wage w 2 {3, 6}
was varied between the sessions but kept fixed within a session. After the
first 20 periods, participants in the NMF treatments were informed that from
the next period on the wage had to be at least w, and in the MF treatments
it was specified after 20 periods that from the next period on the wage had
to be non-negative.
8For example, Anderhub, Engelmann, and Gu¨th (2002), find that behavior in a repeated
trust game with some computer-generated players who are programmed to reward trust
follows quite closely a signalling-equilibrium where second movers reward trust early on
but stop to do so near the end of the supergame.
9 In line with most other experiments investigating fairness in markets, we did not opt
for a neutral frame. First, describing transactions between buyers and sellers avoiding
terms like prices becomes rather convoluted and participants probably understand the
setting once they understand it as a transaction between the buyer and seller. Second, we
wanted to investigate the e↵ects of regulation and it makes sense to frame it as such.
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The experiment was conducted at the experimental economics labora-
tory at the Technical University Berlin. The experiment was programmed
and run using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We had a total of 640 subjects, 256
of which were in the role of workers who did not take any decisions. Each
subject participated only once in one of the 38 sessions, each consisting of
two to four groups of five participants. Each group represents one indepen-
dent observation. Overall, we collected data from 32 groups for each of our
treatments NMF3, NMF6, MF3, and MF6.
At the end of a session, earnings in points were converted at a rate of 200
points = 1 Euro and were paid out in cash. Participants received 5 Euro in
points as an initial endowment. This served to cover possible losses which
can occur if firms sell at a price below the wage or consumers buy for a price
above their valuation, and to ensure that workers get at least some non-trivial
compensation.10 The sessions took between 60 and 90 minutes and average
earnings were around 14.54 Euro (including the initial endowment).11
3 Results
We start with an overview of the prices and wages set by firms and the result-
ing distribution of earnings (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2 we investigate the
choices of consumers and identify two di↵erent strategies of fair consumers.
The main focus is on how these fair choices are a↵ected by the minimum
wage.
10Paying the workers a higher initial endowment was not feasible because it would have
changed the egalitarian price-wage combination and more importantly would have reduced
any fairness motivation to pay them a higher wage. We did observe some participants in
the role of a worker who were clearly unhappy with the fact that they could not make any
choices and also earned only slightly more than their initial endowment.
11If the consumers buy 10 units (all other decisions only determine the distribution of
rents among players), the average payo↵s are 10 Euro plus a 5 Euro initial endowment.
The slightly lower earnings that we observe result from consumers occasionally buying
fewer than 10 units.
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3.1 Firm behavior
3.1.1 Wage and price dynamics
Figure 1 shows the wage and price o↵ers by the firms over time. The values
reported are those set by the firms, not only the wages and prices that were
actually paid.12
We first note that in all treatments, the initial wage and price o↵ers are
close to the fair allocation, independent of the minimum wage levels. We
cannot reject the hypothesis that the median wage o↵er in the first period
is equal to 10 (both at the aggregate level as well as for each treatment
separately; sign tests). Similarly, the first-period median price o↵ers are not
significantly di↵erent from 20 in any treatment (at the 5% level). These
findings suggest that participants in the role of firms understand the game
and are able to determine the fair outcome.
During the first periods the wages and prices drop quickly in all treat-
ments. In the first six periods, all treatments show a significantly negative
time trend. In contrast, in periods 7–20 there are almost no significant time
trends.13 The observed dynamics in the early periods of all treatments might
be driven by firms initially expecting the consumer and the other firm to
be primarily concerned with a fair outcome. When they discover that the
consumer also cares about low prices and that the other firm does not set
a high wage (in combination with a high price), they lower their wage and
price.
In the second half of the experiment we observe a similar but weaker
pattern as in the first half. Wages in the MF treatments and prices in all
treatments decrease in the first six periods after policy changes and are fairly
stable in the following periods 27–40.
12We observe some cases where it appears that a participant in the role of the firm
confused wage and price. We infer this from the fact that for one period the participant
reversed a price-wage pattern that he had chosen before and afterwards. We generally
excluded these observations from the analysis in the paper (2.96% of the data).
13We run OLS regressions of the average wage (price) o↵er on a constant and the period
number (standard errors were clustered at the market level). Only the prices in NMF3
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Figure 1: Average price o↵ers (dotted lines) and wage o↵ers (solid lines)
over time in no-minimum-wage-first treatments (NMF, upper panel) and the
minimum-wage-first treatments (MF, lower panel) and for w = 3 (black) and
w = 6 (gray).
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In the focus of this paper are the medium- and long run e↵ects of policy
changes on consumer behavior. We therefore exclude the first six periods of
each part of the experiment for the remainder of the analysis.
3.1.2 Wage and price levels
We first explore the aggregate e↵ect of a minimum wage on the market
outcome. Table 1 shows the average wage and price o↵er together with
the average earnings of the participants in each treatment and part of the
experiment.
Table 1: Average wage and price o↵er and payo↵ of the consumer, firms, and workers per treatment and
minimum wage policy.
Minimum No minimum wage first (NMF) Minimum wage first (MF)
wage First half Second half Change First half Second half Change
Wage 3 3.51 4.72 1.20 ⇤⇤⇤ 4.92 3.33  1.59 ⇤⇤⇤
o↵er w 6 3.74 6.92 3.18 ⇤⇤⇤ 6.69 3.20  3.50 ⇤⇤⇤
Price 3 12.95 13.32 0.38 12.35 11.47  0.88
o↵er p 6 13.07 15.13 2.06 ⇤⇤ 14.93 12.14  2.79 ⇤⇤⇤
Consumer 3 127.10 122.52  4.58 140.94 148.58 7.64
payo↵ ⇡c 6 124.16 107.07  17.08 ⇤⇤ 115.56 142.06 26.49 ⇤⇤⇤
Firm 3 77.52 70.92  6.60 58.49 67.17 8.67 ⇤⇤
payo↵s ⇡f 6 77.90 68.07  9.83 ⇤ 66.49 76.25 9.76 ⇤⇤
Worker 3 30.13 43.10 12.98 ⇤⇤⇤ 45.36 29.26  16.10 ⇤⇤⇤
payo↵s ⇡w 6 30.38 64.51 34.14 ⇤⇤⇤ 64.13 30.00  34.13 ⇤⇤⇤
Note: The data from the first six periods in each half are excluded. Tests are based on OLS regressions per treatment with
the average wage o↵er, price o↵er, and profits as dependent variables and a constant and a dummy for the minimum wage
regime (experiment half) as independent variables (standard errors were clustered at the market level). Stars represent p-
values from tests of the experiment half against zero: ⇤p < 0.1, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01.
We first note that without a minimum wage, the majority of wage o↵ers
(80%) and the majority of price o↵ers (95.7%) are above the levels predicted
in equilibrium with selfish players. Accordingly, the average wage o↵ers are
always higher than the predicted wage of 0, and also the average prices are
always higher than the predicted price of at most 2. For example, in the
parts of MF3 and NMF3 without a minimum wage, the average wage is 3.51
and 3.33, respectively.
Even when a minimum wage is in place, wage o↵ers are often above the
predicted level. Specifically, 37.6% of wage o↵ers are above the minimum
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wage, and 89.9% of price o↵ers exceed the imposed minimum wage by more
than two units. Accordingly, also the average wage and price o↵ers are above
the predicted level. For example, in the parts of treatments MF3 and NMF3
where a minimum wage of three is in place, the average wage o↵er is 4.92
and 4.72, respectively, i.e., 64% and 57% above the predicted level.
From Table 1 it can also be taken that the average wage o↵ers, and hence
the workers’ earnings, significantly increase when a minimum wage is intro-
duced and significantly decrease when a minimum wage is abolished. On the
other hand, the price level and the consumers’ profits (rows 3–6 in the table)
are only a↵ected significantly when the minimum wage is su ciently high
(NMF6 and MF6). In the two treatments with a minimum wage of six, the
introduction of a minimum wage increases average price o↵ers and decreases
consumer profits while its abolishment decreases average price o↵ers and in-
creases consumer profits. Finally, we observe that prices tend to be more
sticky than wages in the sense that changes in prices over time are always
smaller than respective wage changes. Therefore, the firms tend to lose from
the introduction of a minimum wage (marginally significant in NMF6) while
the abolishment of a minimum wage significantly increases firm profits (MF3
and MF6).
3.2 Consumer behavior
The analysis in the previous section has shown that wages are often above the
level of the subgame-perfect equilibrium with selfish firms and consumers.
In this section, we investigate how consumers respond to the wages and
prices set by the firms. We show that most consumers occasionally act non-
selfishly and that markets with occasionally non-selfish consumers exhibit
higher wages. Further, we show that deviating from selfish behavior is to a
large part driven by two strategies that are in line with short-term and long-
term fairness concerns. We then investigate how a minimum wage crowds
out these strategies.
If a consumer is purely self-interested, we expect her to buy 10 units from
the cheaper firm in periods where the price o↵ers di↵er. When price o↵ers
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do not di↵er, self-interested consumers should buy 10 units with an arbitrary
split between firms. We observe two deviations from this benchmark. First,
in 7.5% of all cases, the consumer buys less than 10 units in total from
both firms although the price o↵ers of both firms are equal to or above the
consumer valuation of 25 only in 0.5% of cases. We do not explore these
choices further since they are relatively rare and, more importantly, are not
driven by social concerns for the workers (or firms). Rather, they constitute
attempts to break the collusive behavior of firms (see Appendix A.2.1 for
more details).14
The second deviation from the benchmark prediction is that in 23% of
all cases where the price o↵ers of the two firms di↵er, the consumer does not
buy exclusively from the cheaper firm. Consumers do this particularly often,
in 35% of cases, when the firm charging the higher price also pays a higher
wage. The average share of units bought from the high-price, high-wage firm
in these cases is 50.3%.
In the following we will use the term “non-selfish” to refer to all cases
where the consumer buys at least one unit from the more expensive firm.
Non-selfish consumer choices are relevant in our setting. First, although
only a minority of consumer choices clearly contradict self-interest, it is the
majority of consumers who do so at least once (66% in NMF3, 75% in NMF6,
66% in MF3, and 72% in MF6).15 Second, even occasional deviations from
self-interest can have a large impact in markets with repeated interactions.
To see this, we look at the first half of the NMF treatments, where the market
participants have not yet experienced and are unaware of any minimum wage
regulation. We can divide these markets according to whether the consumer
14The consumers’ tendency to buy less than 10 units in total is also not significantly
related to the other deviations from the self-interested benchmark prediction (see Appendix
A.2.1).
15 These fractions reflect consumers who deviate at least once during the entire experi-
ment. We also find that when we examine each part of the experiment separately (by the
minimum wage policy) at least half of the consumers deviate at least once in each part of
the experiment, except for the second half in NMF3. The shares in each part before and
after the minimum wage change are 63% and 41% in NMF3, 69% and 56% in NMF6, 53%
and 56% in MF3, and 50% and 63% in MF6.
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deviated from her self-interest at least once (65.6% of consumers, pooled over
NMF3 and NMF6) or whether she always acted self-interestedly (34.4%).
We first note that the wages between the two sets of markets are substan-
tially di↵erent. While the firms in markets with selfish consumers o↵er a wage
of $2.16, on average, the average wage o↵er is about twice as high ($4.38) in
markets where the consumer does not always act selfishly (p < 0.001, rank-
sum test). These di↵erences in market outcomes are not driven by a few
consumers who are particularly fairness concerned and deviate frequently.
Focusing on markets where consumers act non-selfishly only once or twice
yields an average wage o↵er of $3.90, which is significantly higher than the
$2.16 for markets with purely self-interested consumers (p = 0.017). Focus-
ing on the lower of the two wages naturally yields an even starker di↵erence.
In markets where the consumer acts non-selfishly at least once, the average
lower wage o↵er is $3.44 compared to $1.13 (i.e., 205% higher) in markets
with selfish consumers (p < 0.001).16
We cannot show a causal e↵ect of consumer choices on firms due to en-
dogeneity issues in our setting. However, a reverse causality of firm behavior
on consumers seems unlikely given the patterns that we observe. In the first
period, firms do not act di↵erently between the two market clusters with
selfish and non-selfish consumers: in all four treatments, the wage and price
o↵ers are the same whether or not the firms face a selfish or non-selfish con-
sumer.17 Moreover, given the limited market power of the firms, it is unclear
how a single firm who wants to implement fair wages can force the consumer
16We find similar e↵ects of the consumer types when we look at the second half of
markets that abolished a minimum wage (MF3 and MF6). Here, the average [lower] wage
o↵er is $1.88 [$1.29] with selfish consumers and $4.23 [$3.16] with consumers who buy
at least once from the firm with the higher price. We also find e↵ects for the parts of
the experiment where a minimum wage is in place (second half of NMF and first half of
MF) but these are only significant when the minimum wage is not too high, i.e., with
a minimum wage of 3 but not 6 (at the 5% level). Figure 3 in the appendix shows the
outcome of all markets by consumer type.
17Rank-sum tests of the average wage o↵er [price o↵er] in the first period between
markets with selfish and non-selfish consumers yield p = 0.196, p = 0.533, p = 0.799, and
p = 0.516 [p = 0.849, p = 0.480, p = 0.839, and p = 0.385] for the NMF3, NMF6, MF3,
and MF6 treatment, respectively. Pooling over the NMF treatments yield p = 0.222 and
p = 0.855 for wage and price o↵ers, respectively.
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to buy from her, in particular in the cases where she also charges a higher
price.18 Finally, if di↵erences in firm behavior drove consumer reactions, we
would observe more fair consumer behavior when the lower of the two wages
is low, contrary to what we find (see analysis with Table 2 below).
Overall, the comparisons of the two sets of markets suggest that con-
sumers are able to a↵ect the market outcome even with only occasional
deviations from self-interest. We add that the two sets of markets do not
di↵er with respect to the average price o↵er (p = 0.260) or the lower of the
two price o↵ers (p = 0.130), which is a first indication that consumers care
primarily about the workers who have no agency in our setting, and not the
firms.
Observation 1. The majority of consumers deviate at least once from the
self-interested prediction. Markets with such consumers exhibit significantly
higher wages than markets with consumers who always act according to their
self-interest.
We move on to explore how minimum wage changes a↵ect consumer be-
havior, taking into account wage and price o↵ers. Table 2 shows regressions
of the consumers’ propensity to act non-selfishly by buying at least one unit
from the firm with the strictly higher price on a dummy for the time after
the policy change, the lower of the two wage o↵ers, the lower of the two price
o↵ers, and the wage and price spread in each period. The regressions use
only those observations where the price o↵ers of the two firms di↵er (and
thus allow identification of non-selfish behavior). Table 7 in the appendix
shows that the results are qualitatively the same if we use all observations,
including those where the firms o↵er the same price.19
18Note that the consumers buys from the expensive firm in 23% of the cases where price
o↵ers di↵er, and in 35% of the cases where the firm with the higher price also o↵ers a higher
wage. The argument also applies if both firms are equally concerned about the workers. In
addition, if most firms cared equally for the workers and managed to coordinate to break
the consumer’s market power we would expect to see plenty of periods where the firms
o↵er the same price and wage which, however, is only observed in 16.6% of all periods.
19Given our definition of non-selfish behavior (buying at the strictly more expensive
firm), including observations where the price o↵ers are identical means that we underes-
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Table 2: E↵ect of minimum wage change on non-selfish consumer behavior condi-
tional on wage and price o↵ers.
Non-selfish consumer choice
No minimum wage first (NMF) Minimum wage first (MF)
NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
2nd half  0.106⇤⇤⇤  0.251⇤⇤⇤ 0.110⇤⇤ 0.241⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.088) (0.049) (0.063)
Lower wage o↵er 0.043⇤⇤⇤ 0.039 0.028 0.050⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018)
Wage di↵erence 0.027⇤⇤⇤  0.002 0.026⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤
(Higher lower) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
Lower price o↵er  0.004  0.005  0.004 0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Price di↵erence  0.023⇤⇤⇤  0.003  0.039⇤⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤⇤
(Higher lower) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012)
Constant  0.925  0.772  0.920  1.770
(0.392) (0.367) (0.363) (0.505)
N 622 615 631 655
logL  277.187  290.826  288.725  314.767
Note: A non-selfish consumer choice is defined as an observation where a consumer buys one or
more units at the firm with the strictly higher price. Coe cients are estimated marginal e↵ects
(except for the constant) from probit regressions. The regressions include only observations where
the price o↵ers of the two firms di↵er; the first six periods in each half are excluded. Standard er-
rors were clustered at the market level; stars represent p-values from tests against zero: ⇤p < 0.1,
⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01.
The first observation from Table 2 is that the introduction of a minimum
wage (columns 1–2) significantly lowers the consumers’ propensity to act
non-selfishly (first row). The abolishment of a minimum wage (columns 3–4)
has the opposite e↵ect and significantly increases the consumers’ propensity
to act non-selfishly. We also see that the e↵ects of the minimum wage are
increasing in its magnitude. A change in the minimum wage of three changes
timate the true rate of fairness-motivated choices and the e↵ect of policy changes since
consumer choices under identical price o↵ers are often consistent with any behavior (selfish
and fair) but always counted as selfish.
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the consumers’ propensity to act non-selfishly by 10 to 11 percentage points,
and the e↵ect is 24 to 25 percentage points for a minimum wage of six.
Regarding the controls for the wage and price levels, we see that con-
sumers act selflessly more often when the lower of the two wage o↵ers is
high and when the wage gap is large (significant in NMF3 and MF6). These
findings suggest that the consumers’ deviation from self-interest is at least
partially motivated by a desire to help low-income workers. In contrast,
the lower of the two price o↵ers has no e↵ect on consumer behavior, which
suggests that the consumers’ deviation from self-interest is aimed at helping
the workers but not the firms. Finally, larger price di↵erences reduce the
consumers’ tendency to act non-selfishly (significant in all treatments except
NMF6), which suggests that consumers trade o↵ their desire to help the
workers with their own self-interest: the higher the cost to help the workers,
the less likely the consumers do so.
Observation 2. The consumers’ propensity to act non-selfishly by buying
from the more expensive firm, is crowded out when a minimum wage is in-
troduced and crowded in when a minimum wage is abolished. Thus, changes
in consumer choices cannot be explained by di↵erences in wage and price
levels alone.
3.2.1 Fairness strategies
In this section, we investigate non-selfish purchasing behavior in more detail.
For example, how many units do consumers buy from the firm that o↵ers the
higher wage? For expositional purposes, we restrict the analysis in the first
part of the section to observations where one firm sets a strictly higher price
and also a strictly higher wage. Figure 2 shows distributions of the number
of units bought from the high-price, high-wage firm, given that the consumer
bought at least one unit at that firm (35.0% of cases). The left panel shows
a histogram over all these cases. The distribution has three peaks. First,
consumers often buy one or two units at the high-price, high-wage firm,
which is close to the self-interested choice of zero. Second, consumers often
19
buy an equal number of units at each firm even though the two prices di↵er.20
Third, consumers occasionally buy all units from the high-price, high-wage
firm. These observations are unlikely to be due to confusion since in 84.7% of
all cases where consumers bought more units from the firm with the higher
price, this firm also o↵ered a higher wage. Interestingly, both strategies that
di↵er substantially from selfishness (buying five units from each firm and
buying 10 units from the more expensive firm) are well separated from each
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Figure 2: Distributions of the number of units the consumers bought from
the firm with the higher price and the higher wage, conditional on buying at
least one unit at that firm. Left panel: Histogram over all applicable cases
(high-price, high-wage firm exists and at least one unit is acquired from that
firm). Right panel: Kernel density estimates for the same data but restricted
to cases where the lower of the two wage o↵ers is above 5 (solid line) and
below 2 (dotted line). Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
The histogram in the left panel of Figure 2 does not condition on the
wage level. By contrast, the right panel of Figure 2 shows the kernel density
20When considering the whole data set (i.e., including observations where prices are
equal and wages have any level), buying the same number of units from each firm is the
second most frequent choice of consumers (18.5%), which is only chosen less often than
buying all units from one firm (66.9%).
20
estimates for the number of units bought at the high-price, high-wage firm
(conditional on such a firm existing and at least one unit being bought from
that firm) for di↵erent levels of the lower of the two wage o↵ers in each round.
The graph shows that when the lower of the two wage levels is fairly high
(above five; solid line), consumers most often buy equal amounts from both
firms (27%, conditional on buying at least one unit from the high-price, high-
wage firm) and rarely all units from the high-price, high-wage firm (4%). In
contrast, when the lower wage o↵er is below two (dotted line), consumers
most often buy all units from the high-price, high-wage firm (31%) and less
often the same amount from both firms (13%).21 These results suggest that
consumers tend to support both firms and workers even if this is costly, unless
one of the firms o↵ers a wage that is too low. In these cases consumers mostly
buy all units from the firm with the higher wage.
Splitting purchases equally or buying all units from the more expensive
firm might reflect short-term and long-term fairness considerations, respec-
tively. A consumer who wants to split payo↵s equally in the current period
would buy equal or almost equal shares from both firms, even if prices and
wages di↵er. The precise split depends on the fairness motives of the con-
sumer as well as wages and prices.22 On the other hand, a consumer who
wants to induce firms to increase wages, e.g., due to maximin preferences
over the entire game, can buy all 10 units from the firm with the higher wage
and the higher price. Thus, equal splits of purchases appear to primarily
reflect static fairness concerns, whereas purchases of all units from the firm
with the higher price and the higher wage may reflect long-term concerns for
workers or indirect reciprocity.
Buying the same number of units from both firms The strategy
to buy equal amounts at both firms might reflect the consumers’ wish to
21For ease of exposition, the figure does not include the cases with intermediate levels
of the lower wage o↵er (between 2 and 5). This distribution lies well between the other
two (see Figure 4 in the appendix).
22For example, if w1 = 2 and w2 = 3, buying six units from Firm 1 and four units
from Firm 2 would lead to total earnings of 12 for both workers. This satisfies maximin
preferences if pi   wi   wi for i = 1, 2.
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maximize the minimum payo↵ among market participants. The reason is
that a worker is among the least earning market participants in 92.3% of
all observations and in the case of identical wage o↵ers that are above zero
(44.8% of the observations) attempts to maximize the lowest worker profit
would lead a consumer with maximin preferences to buy about five units
from each firm. If the observed behavior of buying similar numbers of units
from both firms is indeed driven by maximin preferences, we would expect
consumers who face di↵ering wage o↵ers to buy more from the firm with the
lower wage o↵er. However, since the calculation of the optimal distribution
given maximin preferences is not trivial to compute, consumers might use
a simple equipartition rule as a heuristic in order to support both workers
roughly equally.
Figure 2 shows that a substantial mass of the distribution is located be-
tween zero and five units. This could either indicate that consumers have
maximin preferences or that the consumers’ willingness to support both work-
ers equally is reduced if the di↵erence between prices or the price level are
very high. In order to examine the validity of these potential explanations,
Table 3 reports on regressions where we estimate the e↵ects of a change
in the minimum wage policy and the price and wage structure on the con-
sumers’ propensity to split purchases equally. The dependent variable is the
negative absolute distance between the quantities the consumers bought at
each firm, which tends to capture both simple 50-50 splits and allocations
from su ciently strong maximin considerations. The estimations reveal that
the consumers’ propensity to buy equal shares is increasing in the lower of
both wage o↵ers wl (significant in NMF3 and MF6 and marginally significant
in NMF6 and MF3). This is consistent with the view that fair consumers
choose an equal split to equalize earnings if they find that wages are at a
satisfactory level. Furthermore, the absolute price di↵erence (in contrast to
the price level) has a negative e↵ect on the consumers’ propensity to split
units equally (though this is significant only in the MF6 treatment), which
corroborates the hypothesis that concerns for equality decrease when it is
relatively more expensive.
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Table 3: E↵ect of minimum wage changes on consumers’ tendency to split units
equally among firms.
Consumers’ tendency to split units equally
No minimum wage first (NMF) Minimum wage first (MF)
NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
2nd half  0.685⇤⇤  2.415⇤⇤⇤ 1.064⇤⇤ 2.491⇤⇤⇤
(0.298) (0.762) (0.466) (0.663)
Lower wage o↵er 0.333⇤⇤⇤ 0.362⇤ 0.253⇤ 0.470⇤⇤⇤
(0.096) (0.202) (0.147) (0.160)
Wage di↵erence 0.118⇤  0.037  0.041 0.177
(Higher lower) (0.065) (0.073) (0.055) (0.113)
Lower price o↵er 0.075 0.094 0.096 0.071
(0.057) (0.058) (0.068) (0.048)
Price di↵erence  0.025  0.040  0.038  0.086⇤⇤⇤
(Higher lower) (0.020) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024)
Constant  9.930⇤⇤⇤  9.781⇤⇤⇤  10.786⇤⇤⇤  12.425⇤⇤⇤
(0.578) (0.734) (0.717) (0.706)
N 622 615 631 655
logL  1588.679  1476.006  1529.296  1579.315
Note: The table shows estimated coe cients of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the
negative absolute di↵erence between the quantities bought at both firms. The regressions include
only observations where the price o↵ers of the two firms di↵ered; the data from the first six pe-
riods in each half are excluded. Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for clusters at the
market level. Stars represent p-values: ⇤p < 0.1, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01.
Finally, reflecting the previous findings on the crowding out and crowding
in of consumers’ non-selfish behavior through minimum wage policies, we
observe that consumers are less likely to distribute their purchases equally
among firms if a minimum wage is in place.
Observation 3. The consumers’ propensity to buy similar shares from both
firms (i) increases in the wage level and decreases the more the two prices dif-
fer, and (ii) is crowded out when a minimum wage is introduced and crowded
in when a minimum wage is abolished.
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Buying all units from the firm with the higher wage As Figure 2
reveals, a non-negligible share of consumer choices is to buy all units from
the firm with the higher price and wage. One possible explanation is that
consumers who care for the workers use this strategy to punish a firm for
paying too low wages. If this is the case, we expect the consumers’ willingness
to buy all units from the high-price, high-wage firm to depend negatively on
the lower of both wage o↵ers. Furthermore, due to the price sensitivity of
fairness concerns, we expect that the consumers’ willingness to buy from the
more expensive firm is lower the higher the di↵erence in the price o↵ers.
Table 4: E↵ect of minimum-wage changes on consumers’ tendency to buy all units
from the high-price, high-wage firm.
Consumer buys all units from the high-price high-wage firm
No minimum wage first (NMF) Minimum wage first (MF)
NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
2nd half  0.017  0.450 0.840⇤⇤⇤ 0.967⇤⇤
(0.226) (0.383) (0.253) (0.465)
Lower wage o↵er  0.001  0.141⇤  0.227⇤⇤  0.022
(0.063) (0.073) (0.115) (0.071)
Wage di↵erence 0.071⇤⇤  0.022 0.340⇤⇤  0.024
(Higher lower) (0.036) (0.055) (0.146) (0.059)
Lower price o↵er 0.039 0.114⇤⇤⇤  0.044 0.024
(0.032) (0.042) (0.087) (0.045)
Price di↵erence  0.002 0.012  0.572⇤⇤⇤ 0.020
(Higher lower) (0.021) (0.053) (0.137) (0.019)
Constant  2.081⇤⇤⇤  2.457⇤⇤⇤  0.977  2.533⇤⇤⇤
(0.330) (0.397) (0.690) (0.792)
N 284 271 315 237
logL  76.772  51.712  51.103  48.930
Note: The table shows estimated coe cients of probit regressions. The dependent variable is a
dummy for observations where the consumer bought all units at the high-price, high-wage firm.
The regressions include only cases where one firm o↵ered both a strictly higher price and a
strictly higher wage; the data from the first six periods in each half are excluded. Standard er-
rors (in parentheses) corrected for clusters at the market level. Stars represent p-values: ⇤p < 0.1,
⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01.
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In order to test these hypotheses, Table 4 reports the regression results
of the consumers’ willingness to buy all units from the high-price, high-wage
firm on a dummy for the change in the minimum wage policy and the price
and wage structure. The estimations show that this propensity of consumers
is indeed decreasing in the lower of both wage o↵ers, though this e↵ect is
significant only in MF3 and marginally significant in NMF6. Moreover, the
absolute wage di↵erence has a significant positive e↵ect on the consumers’
willingness to buy all units from the high-price, high-wage firm in NMF3 and
MF3. Thus, consumers are more willing to pay a high price the higher the
wage at the high-price, high-wage firm in these treatments. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that buying all units from the high-price, high-
wage firm is a long-term strategy to encourage firms to pay higher wages,
which is especially important when the minimum wage is low. Moreover, we
again find evidence of the price sensitivity of fairness concerns. In MF3 the
absolute price di↵erence exerts a significant negative e↵ect and in NMF6 the
price of the other (low-price, low-wage) firm has a significant positive e↵ect.
Finally, we find significant crowding in of the long run strategy when the
minimum wage is abolished but only mild (and insignificant) crowding out
e↵ects after a minimum wage is introduced.
Observation 4. (i) Some consumers are willing to buy all units from the
firm with the higher price as long as it o↵ers a higher wage. (ii) Consumers
more often buy all units from the high-price, high-wage firm, the lower the
wage o↵er of the low-wage firm and the higher the wage di↵erence between
firms. (iii) Abolishing the minimum wage crowds in the consumers’ tendency
to buy all units from the high-price, high-wage firm. There are no significant
crowding out e↵ects from introducing a minimum wage.
4 Structural estimation of consumer prefer-
ences
In this section, we use structural estimation to assess how consumers behavior
is a↵ected by minimum wage interventions. The analysis in the previous sec-
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tion addressed the e↵ects on the prevalence of two specific fairness strategies
separately. The structural estimation presented in this section also allows
us to estimate how the weights that consumers assign to these strategies
changes with changes in the minimum wage policy when both strategies are
considered simultaneously. We use the social welfare model by Charness and
Rabin (2002).
In the static game, a consumer with maximin preferences would buy
nearly equal shares at both firms, but would buy more from the firm paying
the lower wage. In the repeated game, a consumer with maximin preferences
might buy more from the firm with higher wages (as long as the workers earn
less than the firms) if she believes that firms will react by raising wages. An
alternative way to interpret the consumers’ tendency to buy all units from
the high-price, high-wage firm is indirect negative reciprocity. Consumers
“retaliate” on behalf of the worker if the wage is unfairly low. The model by
Charness and Rabin (2002) combines maximin preferences with reciprocity
concerns (besides self-interest and total welfare concerns), and is therefore
well suited to capture the consumers’ fairness strategies in our setting.
The general multi-agent model of Charness and Rabin (2002) (in their
appendix 1) combines concerns for the agent with the lowest income (max-
imin), negative reciprocity, and social welfare. In a game with n players who
pick strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn) that yield material payo↵s ⇡ = (⇡1, . . . , ⇡n),
the CR-utility of player i is given by
(1)


















The most interesting parameter is   2 [0, 1], which is the weight player
i assigns to social concerns relative to her own material payo↵. With   = 0
the model collapses to the benchmark of a purely self-interested (and risk-
neutral) consumer. With   = 1 the consumer does not care di↵erently about
herself than about others and acts based only on social concerns.
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Social concerns consist of three distinct components that are all a↵ected
by the “demerit” of the other players. Individual demerit dj 2 [0, 1] reflects
how much any player i 6= j thinks player j “deserves”. The larger dj, (i) the
less player i considers j in her maximin and social welfare considerations and
(ii) the more disutility player i derives from j’s material payo↵.
Social concerns consist of (i) a  -weighted combination of demerit-
adjusted maximin preferences (first term in the square brackets) and demerit-
adjusted social welfare concerns (second term) and (ii) demerit-based nega-
tive reciprocity (third term) that drive social concerns with intensity f   0.
4.1 Applying the model
For the application to our specific setting, we can simplify the general model
by Charness and Rabin (2002) in several ways. We first note that only the
firms’ demerit matters for the consumer’s utility since the workers have no
agency and, therefore, cannot acquire demerit.
Second, in our setting there is no genuine tradeo↵ between total material
welfare and other motives since the sum of the material payo↵s is constant as
long as the consumer buys 10 units. The only way social welfare (the second
term) di↵ers from the constant material welfare is through the demerit ad-
justment that lowers a firm’s weight in the consumer’s welfare consideration
if the firm misbehaved. The same logic is already captured by the negative
reciprocity component (third term) with the only di↵erence that the e↵ect
of the latter is unbounded and weighted di↵erently relative to the maximin
component (first term). To facilitate the estimation and interpretation of the
results, we ignore social welfare concerns in our application and reweight the
remaining components such that social concerns are a convex combination
of maximin preferences and negative reciprocity.
We next note that the demerit adjustment for the maximin preferences
is of minor relevance in our setting since in the vast majority of the cases a
worker has the lowest income (in 92.3% of cases). That is, maximin prefer-
ences are very close to concerns for a su ciently high wage. We therefore
ignore the firm-specific demerit adjustment for the maximin preferences and
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reserve the role of demerit for negative reciprocity.23 Together with the as-
sumptions above, the consumer’s CR-utility now reduces to
(2)Uc(s, d) = (1   )⇡c +   [ min[⇡c, ⇡w1 , ⇡w2 , ⇡f1 , ⇡f2 ]
+ (1   )( df1⇡f1   df2⇡f2)] .
Our final assumption concerns the demerit of the players that we model
directly as a function of their actions.24 As in Charness and Rabin (2002), we
have to specify an exogenous fairness standard to pin down the predictions
of the model.25 A natural candidate is a wage of 10 and a price of 20 that
lead to the fair allocation.26 To ease interpretation of the results we restrict
demerit to deviations from the fair wage.27 Specifically, we assume that the
demerit dfi of firm fi is given by
(3)dfi = I(wi<w⇤)(w
⇤   wi)/w⇤,
where I(wi<w⇤) is equal to one if a wage o↵er is below the fair wage, and
zero otherwise. That is, a firm’s demerit is the extent to which her wage wi
undercuts the fair wage of w⇤ = 10, normalized to be in [0, 1].
23This also greatly facilitates the estimation of the model. Attempts to include the pa-
rameter b in the estimations yielded either convergence of b to zero or (for other variations
of the model) no convergence at all.
24Charness and Rabin (2002) are not dogmatic about the way demerit is specified in
applications and explicitly leave it “underspecified.” It is only in their appendix 1 that
demerit is fully specified for the definition of the reciprocal-fairness equilibrium. In the
main applications in their paper, demerit is assumed to be 1 if player A chooses to enter
in some of the games, and 0 otherwise.
25In reciprocal-fairness equilibrium, demerit is determined endogenously through what
each player’s strategy reveals about her social concerns  . Players are pessimistic about
each other in the sense that they always take the lowest   that is consistent with someone
else’s behavior, and compare this value with some exogenous fairness standard  ⇤. In
equilibrium, a player’s demerit is the di↵erence between the two.
26Since this price-wage combination that equalizes earnings is independent of the choices
of the other firm, we can base our assessment of demerit directly on the firm’s behavior
rather than on estimates of their  . The exact values of the fairness reference should not
be the ultimate driver of the results in our setting since, for reasonable bounds of f , it is
the relative demerit of the two firms, and not the absolute demerit, that primarily matters
for the consumer choice.
27 We also estimated an extended model where both unfairly low wages and unfairly high
prices evoke demerit. The results are qualitatively the same and the estimated parameters
are very similar (see Table 8 in the appendix).
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4.2 Estimation
We estimate the parameters   and   in equation (2) with Maximum Likeli-
hood. To this end we assume that the consumer always buys 10 units and




Since we are primarily interested in the e↵ects of changes in the min-
imum wage on the consumer’s social concerns as a whole—relative to her
self-interest—we test for a structural break in   by allowing it to di↵er be-
tween the first and the second half of the experiment. That is, we augment
the consumer’s CR utility by letting   =  1 + I(second half)  .
Table 5 shows the estimation results for each treatment. The first row
shows that fairness matters in all markets before the policy change. The
weight consumers assign to social concerns is between 0.21 and 0.40, signif-
icantly larger than zero and, on average, about 12 percentage points higher
when the market starts without a minimum wage in place (NMF) than when
a minimum wage is present initially (MF).
Table 5: Estimates of consumers’ weights   on the disinterested social-welfare criterion
across minimum wage policies.
No minimum wage first (NMF) Minimum wage first (MF)
Parameter NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
 1 (1st half) 0.396⇤⇤⇤ 0.274⇤⇤⇤ 0.209⇤⇤⇤ 0.224⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016)
   (change 2nd half)  0.064⇤⇤⇤  0.094⇤⇤⇤ 0.102⇤⇤⇤ 0.157⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021)
  (over all periods) 0.355⇤⇤⇤ 0.487⇤⇤⇤ 0.332⇤⇤⇤ 0.420⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.042) (0.025) (0.024)
N 875 876 864 863
logL  2603.681  2768.683  1639.954  2096.164
Note: In the CR model,   is the weight the consumers put on the minimum payo↵ of all market par-
ticipants relative to their (negative) reciprocity concerns toward the firms. The data from the first six
periods in each half are omitted. Standard errors were clustered at the market level; stars represent
p-values from tests of parameters against zero: ⇤p < 0.1, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01.
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The main result is given in the second row that shows how the weight
on social fairness concerns changes with minimum wage changes. In line
with our previous findings, the estimations show that the introduction of a
minimum wage leads to significant crowding out of the consumers’ fairness
concerns. The abolishment of a minimum wage, on the other hand, leads to
significant crowding in of consumers’ fairness concerns.
The last row in the table shows how consumers weight reciprocity con-
cerns relative to maximin considerations. For example, in the NMF3 treat-
ment, a $1 increase in the payo↵ of the market participant with the lowest
income is exactly o↵set by the disutility of observing a $0.55 increase in the
profit of a fully misbehaving firm (demerit df = 1 by setting a wage of 0).28
The demerit of a maximally misbehaving firm therefore plays a larger role
for the consumer than the minimum payo↵. While this interpretation and
the exact size of the weights rely on the modeling assumptions we made, the
results clearly show that both fairness motives—maximin considerations and
reciprocity—are important to describe consumer behavior.29
Finally, we test how the relative weights of the fairness components change
with minimum wage interventions. Table 9 in the appendix shows the re-
sults of estimations of the CR model where we also allow for a structural
break of   (in addition to the structural break in   as in Table 5). We first
note that the results confirm that the overall weight on fairness concerns  
significantly decreases when a minimum wage is introduced and significantly
increases when a minimum wage is abolished. Regarding the total impact
each fairness strategy has on consumer behavior (i.e.,   ·   for maximin pref-
erences and   · (1   ) for reciprocity concerns), we find that policy changes
significantly a↵ect consumers’ maximin concerns but not their reciprocity
concerns. The total weight on maximin preferences (  ·  ) significantly de-
creases with minimum wage introductions and significantly increases with
28With the estimated   in NMF3 we get = 0.355/(1  0.355) = 0.55.
29With our simplifying assumptions for equation (2) both maximin considerations and
reciprocity concerns are measured in terms of payo↵. With the full model in (1) the
interpretation is less clear due to the additional parameters b, k, and f that govern the
demerit adjustments for the maximin and social welfare concerns and the intensity of
direct disutility from others’ demerit (reciprocity term), respectively.
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minimum wage abolishments. These findings match the regressions in Table
3 on the consumers’ inclination to support both firms and workers. The net
e↵ect of reciprocity is not significantly a↵ected by policy changes, which is
partially in line with the regressions in Table 4, which showed a significant
e↵ect of policy changes on the consumers’ tendency to buy all units at the
high-price, high-wage firm only for the MF but not the NMF treatments.
With a minimum wage, the relative weight on reciprocity is larger (since   is
smaller), and therefore long-term considerations appear to take a larger role.
We conclude that minimum wages change the overall fairness behavior of
consumers beyond what can be explained by changes in wage and price lev-
els. We have shown this with simple regressions and with a structural model
that is able to capture all salient aspects of consumer behavior in our set-
ting: self-interest, short run concerns for equality, and long run concerns for
su ciently fair wages. In an earlier version of this paper (Danz, Engelmann,
Ku¨bler 2012) we also employed a semi-structural model of consumer choice
aimed at maximizing descriptive accuracy in our setting by capturing the
two fairness strategies of consumers in the most direct manner. Estimations
of this model further corroborate our finding that the changes in consumer
behavior through policy interventions cannot be fully captured by smooth
reactions to wage and price changes. While we are not taking a stance on
whether these changes in consumer behavior reflect genuine changes in pref-
erences that may or may not be rationalized,30our results clearly show that
they are not predicted with standard models and must be explicitly taken
into account.
5 Conclusions
Over the last decades, experimental research has provided important insights
regarding fair behavior in markets. Much of this research investigates situa-
tions where it is obvious what constitutes fair behavior and how fair outcomes
30Generalized models could make the weights on social concerns depend on the presence
of regulation, which would make crowding out and crowding in be aspects of preferences
rather than evidence of preference changes.
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can be achieved. Outside the laboratory, it is often complicated to achieve
fair outcomes or even to decide what is a fair outcome. We have studied
an experimental market where consumers have to take complex decisions to
achieve fair outcomes. We introduced a policy change in this market in order
to investigate how it a↵ects consumer choices and market outcomes.
We have found that although consumers act self-interestedly in a majority
of cases, they also reveal a non-negligible willingness to forgo own payo↵s in
order to support the workers. Specifically, we have identified two strategies of
consumers to implement a fair market outcome. First, in a number of cases
consumers exhibit a preference for an equal split of the purchased quantities
even if the prices of the firms di↵er. Second, if the average wage level is low,
the consumers sometimes buy all units from the more expensive firm if it
o↵ers a higher wage. Buying an equal number of units can be interpreted as
implementing a fair outcome in the short run if the wage level is high enough.
But if wages are too low, fair-minded consumers shift purchases to the firm
with the higher wage, presumably to encourage higher wages in later rounds.
As can be expected from rational consumers, both strategies are chosen less
often when they are too costly, i.e., when the di↵erence in prices is too high.
We thus observe that although achieving fair outcomes for all participants
is far from trivial in our markets, a number of participants in the role of
consumers make an e↵ort to do so. The behavior of consumers encourages
firms to raise wages above the minimum level.
Do legal standards a↵ect the ethical concerns of consumers? We ob-
serve that introducing a minimum wage has a positive e↵ect on the welfare
of workers because the direct e↵ect (i.e., the minimum wage is frequently
binding) overcompensates the negative indirect (crowding-out) e↵ect. The
abolishment of a minimum wage clearly increases the consumers’ willing-
ness to forgo own income in order to support the workers. However, this
crowding-in e↵ect is overcompensated by the direct e↵ect of the abolishment
of the minimum wage such that workers in sum su↵er from the abolishment.
Furthermore, consumers act as if they care less about the equal distribution
of purchases if a minimum wage is in place initially. Therefore, both com-
paring across treatments for the same phase of the experiment and within
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treatments across time, we find that the presence of a minimum wage weak-
ens fairness concerns of consumers but that this e↵ect is dominated by the
direct e↵ect of the minimum wage.
We have provided a behavioral existence proof of crowding out and crowd-
ing in of relatively complex fair choices in markets. However, the abstractions
from natural labor markets (such as the restriction to monopsonistic buyers)
preclude drawing general lessons regarding the e↵ects of minimum wages or
other regulations. Specifically, our finding that the direct e↵ect of a binding
minimum wage dominates the indirect crowding e↵ect certainly depends on
the exact conditions of the market and on the level of the minimum wage.
Moreover, our design excludes any possible impact of minimum wages on
employment levels as well as on the workers’ motivation, which would both
be important determinants of the overall welfare e↵ects of minimum wages.
What our behavioral existence proof implies, however, is that crowding ef-
fects should not be ignored in the context of fair consumer behavior.
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Figure 3: Market outcomes by consumer types. Circle markers are markets
with consumers who always act in line with self-interest. Square markers are
markets with consumers who deviate at least once from self-interest. Dashed
and solid lines are average price and wage o↵ers, respectively.
A.2 Consumer behavior
A.2.1 Buying less than 10 units
Buying less than 10 units in total may either be motivated by self-interest if
consumers try to break collusive behavior of the firms, or by social concerns
for the workers when the consumers regard the overall wage level as too low.
Although such demand withholding is the most powerful tool for changing
the behavior of the firms, it is costly for the consumers since the loss of
buying less than 10 units is much higher than buying from a firm with a
relatively high price.31
If the willingness to buy less than 10 units is driven by social concerns
for the workers, we should observe this behavior more often when wage o↵ers
are low. On the other hand, if the consumers buy less than 10 units out of
self-interest, we would expect to observe it more often when the lower of both
price o↵ers pl is high. Table 6 reports regressions where we estimated the
e↵ect of the wage and price structure in the market on consumers’ propensity
to reduce consumption below 10 units.
The regressions show that the consumers’ propensity to buy less than 10
units is significantly increasing in the lower of both prices in all treatments,
except in MF3 with only marginal significance. Thus, buying less than 10
units does not appear to be the result of confusion of the consumers. Since
wages do not have any significant e↵ect, we conclude:
Observation 5. The consumers’ willingness to buy less than 10 units is
driven by self-interest only, with higher prices decreasing the likelihood that
all 10 units are bought.
We add that the consumers’ propensity to buy less than 10 unit is un-
related to the consumers’ propensity to buy from the firm with the strictly
higher price. Both actions together occur in only 1.3% of the cases and
31Nevertheless,we observe that demand withholding is sometimes quite extreme. In
19.8% of the cases where the consumers bought less than 10 units in total (and at least
one price o↵er is below 25), they buy nothing at all.
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Table 6: E↵ect of minimum-wage changes on consumers’ tendency to buy less than
10 units in total.
Consumer buys less than 10 units in total
No minimum wage first (NMF) Minimum wage first (MF)
NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
2nd half  0.016  0.413  0.187 0.123
(0.133) (0.298) (0.230) (0.342)
Lower wage o↵er  0.036  0.040  0.055 0.036
(0.044) (0.061) (0.047) (0.050)
Wage di↵erence 0.047  0.038  0.040  0.009
(Higher lower) (0.036) (0.046) (0.037) (0.032)
Lower price o↵er 0.068⇤⇤⇤ 0.094⇤⇤⇤ 0.065⇤ 0.156⇤⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.027) (0.035) (0.042)
Price di↵erence 0.003  0.005 0.007 0.000
(Higher lower) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016)
Constant  1.994⇤⇤⇤  1.975⇤⇤⇤  2.177⇤⇤⇤  4.710⇤⇤⇤
(0.285) (0.548) (0.477) (0.811)
N 875 876 864 863
logL  295.711  300.470  134.051  55.980
Note: The table shows estimated coe cients of probit regressions. The dependent variable is a
dummy for observations where the consumer bought less than 10 units in total from both firms.
The data from the first six periods in each half are excluded. Standard errors (in parentheses)
corrected for clusters at the market level. Stars represent p-values: ⇤p < 0.1, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p <
0.01.
they are statistically independent.32 This result is not surprising given that
both behavioral patterns are motivated di↵erently (social concerns motivate
purchases from the firm with the higher price while self-interest motivates
buying less than 10 units).
32A probit regression of a dummy variable for consumers buying less than 10 units on
a dummy variable for consumers buying at the firm with the strictly higher price as the
independent variable yields p = 0.860 (standard errors clustered at the market level).
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Figure 4: Kernel density estimates of units the consumers bought from the
firm with the higher price and the higher wage, conditional on buying at
least one unit at that firm: Cases where the lower of the two wage o↵ers is
below 2 (dotted line), between 2 and 5, inclusive (dashed line), and above 5
(solid line). Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 7: Regressions of non-selfish consumer choice on minimum wage policies
(including observations where price o↵ers do not di↵er and choices motivated
by fairness considerations cannot be identified).
Non-selfish consumer choice
No minimum wage first (NMF) Minimum wage first (MF)
NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
2nd half  0.069⇤⇤  0.170⇤⇤⇤ 0.079⇤⇤ 0.151⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.058) (0.034) (0.051)
Lower wage o↵er  0.006  0.007  0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Wage di↵erence 0.022⇤⇤⇤ 0.002 0.019⇤ 0.037⇤⇤⇤
(Higher lower) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Lower wage o↵er 0.026⇤⇤⇤ 0.025 0.016⇤ 0.032⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.014)
Price di↵erence  0.006 0.004  0.015⇤⇤  0.016⇤⇤⇤
(Higher lower) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
N 875 876 864 863
logL  343.933  340.030  356.700  391.687
Note: Coe cients are estimated marginal e↵ects from probit regressions (constant omit-
ted). Non-selfish consumer choice is defined as a consumer buying one or more units at the
(strictly) more expensive firm. The data from the first six periods in each half are omitted.
Standard errors were clustered at the market level; stars represent p-values from tests against
zero: ⇤p < 0.1, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01.
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A.2.3 Reciprocial fairness estimations
Table 8: Estimates of consumers’ weights on the disinterested social-welfare criterion  
across minimum wage policies. Same specifications as in Table 5 but reciprocity toward
firms includes wages and prices.
No minimum wage first (NMF) Minimum wage first (MF)
Parameter NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
  (1st half) 0.388⇤⇤⇤ 0.263⇤⇤⇤ 0.205⇤⇤⇤ 0.190⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014)
   (change 2nd half)  0.056⇤⇤⇤  0.169⇤⇤⇤ 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.176⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019)
  (over all periods) 0.366⇤⇤⇤ 0.750⇤⇤⇤ 0.341⇤⇤⇤ 0.506⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.031) (0.025) (0.024)
N 875 876 864 863
logL  2623.386  2861.795  1647.164  2187.463
Note: The firm’s demerit is defined as dfi = I(wi<w⇤)(w
⇤  wi)/w⇤ + I(pi>p⇤)(pi   p⇤)/(50  p⇤), where
w⇤ = 10 and p⇤ = 20. Within the disinterested social-welfare criterion,   is the weight the consumers
put on the minimum payo↵ of all market participants relative to their (negative) reciprocity concerns
toward the firms (reciprocity toward firms includes wages and prices). The data from the first six peri-
ods in each half are omitted. Standard errors were clustered at the market level; stars represent p-values
from tests of parameters against zero: ⇤p < 0.1, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01.
43
Table 9: Estimates of consumers’ weights on the disinterested social-welfare criterion   across minimum wage
policies. Same specifications as in Table 5 but (i) reciprocity toward firms includes wages and prices and (ii)
allows for structural break in   (in addition to  ).
No minimum wage first (NMF) Minimum wage first (MF)
Parameter NMF3 NMF6 MF3 MF6
  (1st half) 0.386⇤⇤⇤ 0.262⇤⇤⇤ 0.221⇤⇤⇤ 0.286⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.022)
  (1st half) 0.383⇤⇤⇤ 0.757⇤⇤⇤ 0.260⇤⇤⇤ 0.264⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.031) (0.040) (0.034)
   (change 2nd half)  0.051⇤⇤  0.135⇤⇤⇤ 0.089⇤⇤⇤ 0.083⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.025)
   (change 2nd half)  0.033  0.229⇤⇤ 0.114⇤⇤ 0.273⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.114) (0.049) (0.041)
N 875 876 864 863
logL  2622.856  2860.703  1644.704  2175.936
Test of nonlinear combinations of parameters after estimation
Maxmin 1st half:   ·   0.148⇤⇤⇤ 0.198⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.076⇤⇤⇤
Maxmin 2nd half: ( +  ) · (  +  ) 0.117⇤⇤⇤ 0.067⇤⇤⇤ 0.116⇤⇤⇤ 0.198⇤⇤⇤
Change maxmin  0.031⇤⇤  0.131⇤⇤⇤ 0.059⇤⇤⇤ 0.123⇤⇤⇤
Reciprocity 1st half:   · (1   ) 0.238⇤⇤⇤ 0.064⇤⇤⇤ 0.163⇤⇤⇤ 0.211⇤⇤⇤
Reciprocity 2nd half: ( +  ) · (1       ) 0.217⇤⇤⇤ 0.060⇤⇤ 0.194⇤⇤⇤ 0.171⇤⇤⇤
Change reciprocity  0.020  0.004 0.031  0.040
Note: The firm’s demerit is defined as dfi = I(wi<w⇤)(w
⇤ wi)/w⇤+I(pi>p⇤)(pi p⇤)/(50 p⇤), where w⇤ = 10 and p⇤ = 20. Within
the disinterested social-welfare criterion,   is the weight the consumers put on the minimum payo↵ of all market participants rela-
tive to their (negative) reciprocity concerns toward the firms (reciprocity toward firms includes wages and prices). The data from
the first six periods in each half are omitted. Standard errors were clustered at the market level; stars represent p-values from tests
of parameters against zero: ⇤p < 0.1, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01.
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B Instructions (translated from German)33
Welcome to this experiment. You can earn money during this experiment
and your earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions of other par-
ticipants.
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have a question, please raise
your hand. We will answer your questions in private. The instructions are
the same for all participants.
The experiment consists of several periods. At the beginning of the experi-
ment, each participant is randomly assigned to a role that remains the same
throughout the experiment. You know your own role but not the roles of
the other participants. Of course, your anonymity will be kept during the
entire experiment. This means that your identity is not revealed to other
participants. The same applies to all participants.
In the experiment, there are firms, workers, and consumers. There are two
firms, and each firm is matched with a worker who can produce a maximum of
ten units of a good. The number of units the worker produces is determined
by the number of units the consumer buys from the firm. The firm sets the
wage the worker receives per unit sold. Throughout the experiment, a worker
is assigned to the same firm. Both firms produce the same good. Both firms
o↵er the good to the same consumer. The consumer can buy a maximum of
ten units of the good and can choose how many units to buy from each firm.
At the beginning of the experiment, two firms, two workers, and one con-
sumer—that is, five participants—are grouped together. Throughout the
experiment this group assignment remains the same. This means that the
firms, workers, and the consumer you deal with are the same in each period.
The payo↵s of the participants are measured in points and depend on their
role:
• The worker receives a wage that is paid by their firm. The wage is
paid per unit, that is, the worker receives a fixed payment per unit sold
which is set by the firm. [MF Treatments: The wage must be at least
three [six] points.] The worker does not have a decision to make. If the
33Treatment di↵erences and annotations are provided in square brackets.
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consumer does not buy anything from the firm, the worker receives no
wage, and thus has a payo↵ of zero.
• The firm receives the price multiplied by the number of units the con-
sumer buys from this firm, minus the wage payment to the worker. If
the consumer does not buy anything from the firm, the firm does not
have to pay wages and hence gets a payo↵ of zero.
• The value the consumer attaches to each unit of the good is 25 points.
They can buy a maximum of 10 units, but they can also buy less. This
means that they get 250 points, minus the total price if he buys 10 units
of the good. If the consumer buys fewer than 10 units, they receive the
number of units multiplied by 25 minus the sum of the prices they
must pay for the units. The consumer can distribute the number of
purchased units between the two firms in an arbitrary way, and the
consumer is not forced to buy from any of the two firms. If a consumer
buys nothing, they receive a payo↵ of zero in this period.
The timeline of the experiment is as follows:
1. First, the two firms choose the wage for their worker and the price at
which they want to sell each unit of the good. [NMF Treatments: The
wage and the price must be between 0 and 50 points.][MF Treatments:
The wage must be between 3 [6] and 50 points and the price between
0 and 50 points.]
2. The consumer learns the price set by each firm, and the wage they pay
their workers. The consumer then decides how many units they want
to buy from each firm.
3. The purchases are completed.
4. The decisions and payo↵s of all participants are displayed on the screen.
This situation is repeated 20 times. Then another 20 periods follow, before
which we will inform you of a change in the rules. However, the roles of all
participants in the second part remain the same as in the first part, and also
the group assignments remain the same as before.
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Your total payo↵ is the sum of the payo↵s in all periods. The exchange rate
for the points you can earn during the experiment is 200 points = 1 Euro.
At the beginning of the experiment you receive a fixed payment of 5 Euro.
If you make losses during the experiment, they will be covered by the fixed
amount.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. We will then answer your
questions in private.
[Change after the 20th period announced on computer screen:]
There is now a change in the market rules. [NMF Treatments: The wage
that a firm sets for its workers must be at least three [six] per unit.][MF
Treatments: The wage that a firm sets for its workers, must be no longer
at least three [six] per unit. However, it cannot be less than 0.] Everything
else remains the same. In particular, the wages are still paid only if the firm
is selling something.
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